


# Climate policy in UK and Europe

On theories and the law of unintended consequences

# One perspective on the context ...

UK policy context (60% target by 2050), implies both much cleaner energy and big improvements in energy efficiency (x10 C.intensity)



The 2003 Energy White Paper set the UK on a path to reduce carbon emissions by 60% by 2050 through a combination of energy efficiency in the short term and renewables in the long term:


*"[To achieve the required savings from energy efficiency] would need roughly a doubling of the rate of energy efficiency improvement seen in the past thirty years"*

*"Technology innovation will have a key part to play in underpinning all our goals and delivering a low carbon economy"*

*"To deliver these outcomes our aim will be to provide industry and investors with a clear and stable policy framework"*


Note: Figures in brackets show UK carbon intensity (MtC/£Bn), Scenarios show 2050 projections  
 Source: RCEP 1998, DTI EP68 GDP growth forecasts, IAG "Long-term Reductions in GHG in the UK", Feb 2002

# First part of presentation will sketch foundations of the CT's CCPR study and then focus on the quantitative tools and results




# Segmenting emissions by entity type and use enables opportunity and barriers to change to be mapped by sector

Carbon Emissions by Segment



Note: \*Includes a bottom-up estimate of numbers of central government organisations; Source: Ecofys


# Technology-based 'bottom-up' models generate abatement cost curves that suggest large potential for cost-effective gains



Note: \*Carbon saving from existing measures only, **does not include opportunity in new builds and refurbishments accessed through building regulations** (additional 3.7MtC pa – prior to overlaps with other instruments) or innovation.  
Source: Ecofys analysis based on BRE and ENUSIM abatement curves

# Analysis of barriers and drivers for energy efficiency

From a business/policy perspective, delivering energy efficiency requires addressing the factors that drive, and impede, changes in organisational decision-making



# Strong evidence base on all elements of driver-barriers but the balance differs between uses and sectors

Cost/benefit depends on time horizons: 'The further down the organisation, the shorter the time horizon'

## 'Hidden costs' are diverse

- Perceived risk of new technologies giving lower quality and performance
- High transition costs to operations

*"The new energy efficiency motors do not fit in the old imperial frames... transition costs are high."*

Transaction costs also important

## Market misalignments dominate 'embedded' performance

*"Our worst property is 13 times worse than the best' - major retailer'*

*'You should be pleased if have the measurement systems in place to know that' - response from another retailer*

*"OEMs control the distribution of motors - most companies do not even know what type of motor they have purchased - hidden in kit."*

## Weak drivers for change limit organisational commitment

- Energy is not relevant to "core business"
- Lack of senior level commitment
- Lack of resources focused on energy management
- Engineers do not have a budget for energy efficiency improvements."
- "ECAs target finance departments - engineers never receive the benefits of taking up ECAs."

*Combined effect is to make Awareness and Motivation critical aspects:*

*"CCLA's were far more likely to have taken action to improve energy efficiency ...87% of CCLA firms had taken action or were planning to do so compared with 42% of non-CCLA firms" (Source: CBI/EEF review of CCL, October 2002)*

# The drivers & barriers fall into four main categories that define the scope and targeting of policy

Issue	Definition	Examples	Policy options
Financial cost/benefit	Ratio of investment cost to value of energy savings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ More expensive but more efficient equipment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic instruments that reduce equipment cost or finance cost, or increase energy prices</li> <li>▪ Direct legislative drivers on energy / emissions</li> </ul>
Expanded cost/benefit (intangible, transaction and transition costs)	Cost or risk (real or perceived) of moving (or not moving) to more energy-efficient practices including managerial, information, risk and decision-making requirements, not captured above	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Costs &amp; risks of change               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Incompatibility</li> <li>- Performance risk</li> <li>- Management time</li> <li>- Other transaction costs</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Exposure of not changing               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Higher emissions risk</li> <li>- Equipment obsolescence</li> <li>- Customer / employee pressure</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Services providing information, technical support</li> <li>▪ Packaged energy service contracts</li> <li>▪ Standards requiring use of a particular technology/solution, e.g. product standards, etc. to avoid transaction costs</li> </ul>
Market Misalignment (split incentives, system failures regulatory failures)	Market structure and constraints that prevent consistent tradeoff between specific energy efficient investment and the societal energy saving benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Landlord / tenant split</li> <li>▪ Regulatory failures e.g. in electricity</li> <li>▪ First-mover costs and risks</li> <li>▪ Externally-imposed budget constraints</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Contractual or market organisation solutions to split incentives between organisations</li> <li>▪ Product standards</li> <li>▪ Capital market solutions (e.g. public sector financing scheme)</li> <li>▪ Socialisation of first-mover costs</li> </ul>
Behaviour & motivation (inertia, awareness, materiality)	Internal issues of firm behaviour linked to awareness, motivation and internal organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Organisational failures (e.g.. internal split incentives)</li> <li>▪ Inertia, rules of thumb</li> <li>▪ Tendency to ignore small opportunities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Campaigns, sector learning networks</li> <li>▪ "Attention raising" instruments: e.g. trading; CCAs with sector targets and 'cliff' incentives (tax exemption)</li> <li>▪ ECA lists and low interest loans available to equipment purchasers in organisations</li> </ul>

Issues of 'materiality' underpin several barriers –  
eg. NPV of significant proportion of abatement  
measures in average building are not very material

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# Instruments and Applications

Making business sense of climate change



# Barrier/driver analysis (four categories): diverse barriers to optimal investment especially in building-related uses

large organisations also demonstrate capital inconsistencies


	Large energy intensive industry*	Large non-energy intensive organisations	Public sector	SMEs	
<b>Building energy use</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Financial C/B**</li> <li>•Expanded C/B</li> <li>•Market misalignment</li> <li>•<b>Behaviour &amp; motivation</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Financial C/B</li> <li>•Expanded C/B</li> <li>•<b>Market misalignment</b></li> <li>•Behaviour &amp; motivation</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Financial C/B</li> <li>•Expanded C/B</li> <li>•Market misalignment</li> <li>•<b>Behaviour &amp; motivation</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In buildings energy use, main driver/barrier differs by market segment but is <b>not financial C/B</b></li> </ul>
<b>Manufacturing energy use</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<b>Financial C/B</b></li> <li>•Expanded C/B</li> <li>•Market misalignment</li> <li>•Behaviour &amp; motivation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Financial C/B</li> <li>•Expanded C/B</li> <li>•Market misalignment</li> <li>•<b>Behaviour &amp; motivation</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<b>Financial C/B</b></li> <li>•Expanded C/B</li> <li>•Market misalignment</li> <li>•Behaviour &amp; motivation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In manufacturing energy use, <b>financial C/B is important, other costs and barriers matter too</b></li> </ul>

• Issues of behaviour and motivation (and how they affect internal organisation) are significant & sometime dominant for all large organisations

• A generic barrier across all SME energy use is non-financial costs, particularly **transaction costs**

\* Includes EU ETS and CCA sector companies with >50 employees


The current Climate Change Programme has instruments appropriate to the large energy intensive operations but does not address main barrier-drivers in other categories



- EU ETS and CCA focused on large-energy intensive industry
- CCL is only economic instrument acting upon remaining sectors
- Standards and support measures used across all segments

# Mapping policy instruments to key barriers that need to be overcome

**Challenge is to unlock potential in groups 2,3 and 4:**



# Some unintended consequences of the Climate Change Levy

- **The theory**
  - A price instrument (widely criticised for not being in proportion to carbon) intended to drive price-based efficiency and factor substitution
- **The practice**
  - A funding source: not to be underestimated ..
  - An “announcement effect” that grabbed attention
  - Shifts the base of industrial negotiation, thereby driving real change through the Climate Change Agreements, and of everything else that follows ...
- **But also**
  - A lock-in to a certain kind of taxation

# The impacts of the EU ETS

# EU ETS can substantially increase marginal operating costs, but (eg. cement) can maintain profits with only modest pass-through & price impact (current allocns)

	<u>Increase in marginal production cost, %</u>	<b>Cost pass-through required to maintain sector operating profits</b>	
		<u>Proportion of increase in marginal cost passed through to prices, %</u>	<u>Increase in wholesale cement price, %</u>
Scenario 1 €5/tCO <sub>2</sub>	27.3%	7.0%	0.6%
Scenario 2 €15/tCO <sub>2</sub>	70.5%	7.5%	2.0%
Scenario 3 €25/tCO <sub>2</sub> w/cutback	136.3%	39.7%	16.8%

Phase 1 & 2, direct allocation helps offsets electricity price rise (c.90% cost pass-through in electricity)  
 Long term scenario, required cement cost pass through increases as its direct allocation is cut back 30%


Profit-maximising pass through predicted by market modeling: c.80%

# As a result, participating sectors profit ...

## Non-participants carry the cost, Al. may exit if buys from grid

### Policy coverage

**Value at stake in 2020, %\***  
 (% change in EBITDA predicted by Cournot model in brackets)



### General Insights

- All ETS sectors profit under our standard allocations, as product pricing effects outweigh net input cost increase
- ETS enables these sectors to capture bulk of the 'scarcity rent'
- At €30/tCO<sub>2</sub> both cement and steel approaching turning point from imports
- Sectors outside ETS face the higher prices, Al. exits if on grid

• Steel imports impact profit taking at higher prices, still profit from ETS under 30% cutback but only a little

• Cement imports constrain cost pass through, 30% cutback neutralises gains

• Marginal effect as energy is small fraction costs and profits

Note: \*Value at stake = (increase in total costs after allowance allocation)/(starting EBITDA); high variant scenarios with CCL doubled; carbon price of 30Euro/tCO<sub>2</sub> and cut back of 1% pa versus business as usual projected emissions

Source: Oxera

# Some unintended consequences of the European Emissions Trading Scheme

- **The theory & perception**

- A market-based instrument to add 'carbon costs' as efficiently as possible on the most sensitive, energy-intensive sectors to incentive reductions

- **The practice**

- A source of big profits
- .. Making industry rich enough to think long term
- .. Invest in longer term technology
- .. and start to lobby for its continuation

- **But also**

- A tool to subsidise investments, including in carbon intensive investments through perverse allocation mechanisms
- .. An invitation to gaming, inflating emission projections, making the case for need for higher carbon investments
- .. That is proving the cause of its own undoing .. Watch the News on 15 May!

# Macroeconomic analyses

The two macro models predict very different impacts on GDP – including generally opposite signs - as well as different sectoral composition effects

Numbers indicate % GDP (at factor cost\*) difference from base case (low CCL & ETS)

<b>All scenarios, Double Climate Change Levy</b>	Cambridge Economic Models		Oxford Economic Forecasting	
	2010 ETS €25/tCO <sub>2</sub>	2010 ETS €15/tCO <sub>2</sub>	2010 ETS €15/tCO <sub>2</sub>	2020 ETS €30/tCO <sub>2</sub>
ETS price scenario	2	2	2	2
<b>Current CCP structure</b>	0.01%	-0.01%	-0.3%	-0.7%
<b>Targets extension</b>	0.25%	0.28%	0.0%	-0.2%
<b>EU ETS extended</b>	0.25%	0.28%	-0.1%	-0.6%
<b>“Focus” package</b>	0.27%	0.30%	-0.3%	-0.9%

\* c.x2 at market prices: government guidelines exclude transfer payments in GDP

*Note: the direction of difference is opposite from that usually found in the literature!*

## Analysis of models and discussions with consultants suggest two main hypotheses to explain the wide differences in GDP impacts

*Whether or not revenues raised by economic instruments can be used productively*

- The General Equilibrium formulation has no revenues – it measures impact on input costs as a factor of production with no offsetting gains possible from revenue recycling (the OEF model also has a fixed labour supply).
- Cambridge Econometrics assume revenue recycling via reduction in Employee National Insurance Contributions. With an elastic labour supply, the reduced cost of labour boosts employment (by 5 – 50,000 jobs) which may help boost GDP


The difference in the Focus package may be biggest because the new instrument analysed for service sector (auctioned allowances) raises money

*Whether announcement and awareness effects, in response to introduction of new instruments, can invoke behavioural (managerial, structural) energy-saving responses independent of price and if so at what scale and persistence*

OEF incorporate a direct investment response in the case of

But through it all – price *does matter* ...

Cross-country comparisons suggest final national energy expenditure per unit GDP is insensitive to price in long term (elasticity -1), price increases match increased efficiency



# Conclusions and additional approaches

# APPENDIX

- Emissions mapping across 4 entity types
- Description of all new and existing policy instruments

# Characteristics of large energy intensive industry

## Breakdown of Large (>50 employees) Energy Intensive Industry Emissions 2002, %

100% = 25MtC

4%	Other*	4%	Buildings	6%	Oil Process Emission	8%	Not Cov'd***
7%	Aluminium	8%	Autogen**	9%		15%	CCL
8%	Paper	13%	Utility Services	27%	Gas	31%	CCA
13%	Cement & Lime	75%	Manuf'ing	29%	Coal/Coke	46%	EU-ETS
10%	Food & Drink			29%	Electricity		
29%	Chemicals			29%			
29%	Steel						
By Sector		By Use		By Fuel		By Instrument	

### Key Characteristics

- Steel and Chemicals generate >50% of emissions

- Manufacturing dominates energy intensive industrial emissions

- The fuel mix is split quite evenly between electricity, coal/coke and gas


- EU-ETS is the key regulatory instrument for this entity type

Note: \*Other includes Bricks, Ceramics, Glass and Other Non-Ferrous Metals; \*\*Autogeneration emissions associated with 'inefficiency' of self-generation (emissions due to electricity created included in total for electricity); \*\*\* Not Cov'd - Process emissions not covered by existing instruments

# Characteristics of large non-energy intensive companies

## Breakdown of Large (>250 employees) Energy Intensive Industry Emissions 2002, %

100% = 13MtC



■ Industry

### Key Characteristics


- Emissions are spread relatively evenly across sectors
- Buildings usage accounts for over 60% of emissions
- The fuel mix is dominated by electricity
- CCL is the key regulatory instrument for this entity type

Note: \*Other includes Transport & Storage, Real Estate, Construction, Non-Metallic Minerals, Printing, Textiles, Water and Other Industries;  
 \*\*Autogeneration emissions associated with 'inefficiency' of self-generation

# Characteristics of public sector organisations

## Breakdown of Public Sector Emissions 2002, %

100% = 6MtC




### Key Characteristics

- Public sector emissions are exclusively buildings-related
- Electricity and gas make up 90% of the fuel mix
- CCL is the key regulatory instrument for this entity type

# Characteristics of SMEs

## Breakdown of industrial (>50 emps) and service (>250 emps) SME Emissions 2002, %



### Key Characteristics

- SME emissions are highly fragmented by sector
- Buildings make up ~2/3rds of SME emissions
- Electricity makes up 2/3 of the SME fuel mix
- Although CCL is the key regulatory instrument for SMEs, 11% of SMEs are covered by EU-ETS

Note: \*Other Industry includes Bricks, Cement, Ceramics, Glass, Aluminium, Other Non-Ferrous Metals, Construction, Vehicle Engineering, Water, Non Metallic Minerals, Printing, Paper, Electrical Engineering and Other Industries; \*\*Other Serv includes Transport & Storage and Real Estate; \*\*\*Auto Generation emissions associated with 'inefficiency' of self-generation; \*\*\*\*Not Cov'd - Process emissions not covered by existing instruments